



CATÓLICA
UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA PORTUGUESA | PORTO
Faculdade de Economia e Gestão

DOCUMENTOS DE TRABALHO

WORKING PAPERS

ECONOMIA

ECONOMICS

Nº 05/2007

VALUES, NORMS, TRANSACTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS

Américo Mendes

Universidade Católica Portuguesa (Porto)

Values, norms, transactions and organizations*

AMÉRICO M. S. CARVALHO MENDES

Faculty of Economics and Management

Portuguese Catholic University

Rua Diogo Botelho, 1327

4169-005 Porto - Portugal

amendes@porto.ucp.pt

Abstract

This paper may be considered an essay on metaeconomics, since it deals with the meaning of several concepts often left undefined, or very briefly defined in economic theories. These concepts are the following: value including the values of things and moral values, social norms or institutions, social power, goods and services, transactions and organizations (firms, and others).

The paper starts by proposing a general concept of value, encompassing both the value of things and moral values. From this concept it proceeds to the definition of six different types of values of things and moral values and to the concept of value transformation process of things which includes all the operations dealt with in economic theory as well as many other human actions.

The last part of the paper starts with the distinction between moral values and social norms (or institutions) and the roles of social power and human organization in connecting the domains of morality and social normativity. The paper proceeds by distinguishing different types of norms, including possession norms which are important for defining the concepts of goods and services and transaction processes. (JEL: A13; Z13).

* This paper was prepared with the financial support of Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia – Programa Operacional Ciência e Inovação 2010 and the Portuguese Catholic University.

Meta-axiological questions: what is value?

Objectivism versus subjectivism: is there a third way out?

In this introductory section we will deal with the meta-axiological question of the ontological status of values: the values of things and the values of human actions, or moral values. This discussion usually jumps between two extreme points:

- **objectivism:** values are objective in the sense of existing *per se*, in things or in human actions, independently of human perception about them;
- **subjectivism:** values are subjective creations of human beings, existing *per se* in the minds of their creators.

If values can exist *per se* either in objects external to the evaluator, or in the mind of the evaluator, how can they be practical, that is, how can they engage the action of the evaluator? To be practical, values have to be attached both to the individual who acts, and to the things on which he acts or to the other individuals with whom he interacts. So here we will support the positions of those for whom values don't inhabit neither in an "objective" world existing outside of human lives, nor in a purely "subjective" world [MERLEAU-PONTY, 1945].

Values are embodied mental images

Values are neither "objective" properties which things or human actions hold *per se*, independently of human perception about them, nor are simply mental images human beings make about objects in their lives irrespective of the characteristics of

those objects. Values are embodied mental images human beings make about things and actions in their lives.

Embodied means that they don't exist independently of all the relationships (physical, psychological, social) linking the subject with the object of value.

Values are human creations ex nihilo

Being embodied mental images does not mean that values are specular reflexes of external objects in human minds. They are creations of human beings, but not creations *in nihilo*, or *cum nihilo*. They are creations *ex nihilo*, grounded on characteristics of things or actions existing independently of those values.

Values are feelings

Being embodied mental images, values are generated by some kind of emotion. Therefore they are feelings, since they are mental images of emotions [DAMÁSIO, 1994]. Because they are driven by emotions, values make human beings to desire or to reject their objects. So they are motivations for some kind of human action.

Values are intentional

Values have a meaning and a reference. They are feelings of someone about something [SCHELER, 1955]. Therefore they are grounded in a simultaneous separation [SIMMEL, 1977] and articulation between the subject evaluator and thing or action evaluated: we value something we project before us, but which is at our reach, to some extent.

Values are about things or about human actions

Values are about things or human actions (actions actually performed, intentions to perform certain kinds of actions, or dispositions of character to perform certain kinds of actions). In this second case they are what are called "moral values". These values have the following characteristics:

a) they involve **sympathy**, in the sense that what is valued (own or someone else's actions, intentions or dispositions of character) always involve taking into consideration other people [HUTCHESON, 1971; HUME, 1978; SMITH, 1975].;

b) they are **prescriptive**, in the sense of not being expressed as propositions which can be true or false, but as imperatives which a human being should follow in his actions;

c) this prescriptiveness has a **justification** [TUGENDHAT, 1993] (religious beliefs, feelings generated by the human capacity for sympathy, judgements generated by human reason) which is or can be made explicit by the moral subject;

d) prescriptiveness is referred to some kind of **bipolarity**, in the sense that moral values induce behaviours of affection or rejection with respect to their objects [ANDRÈS, 1994];

e) deviations of behaviour from this polar orientation generate an **internal sanction** for the moral subject (a feeling of guilt);

f) moral values have a certain **durability**, that is, they remain as self prescribed behaviours of a human being for a relatively long period of time [KLUCKHOHN *et al.*, 1952];

g) moral values have some **priority** over other values the moral subject can give to human actions, in the sense of being the superior criterion the person ultimately uses for that evaluation [ANDRÈS, 1994].

Values are practical

Values are practical images, in the sense, that they are about some kind of action related their objects. More precisely, values can be about six possible dimensions of human action:

a) **functionality** (what can I do with this?): other objects the subject thinks can be done using the valuable object;

b) **exchangeability** (what can I get with this?): other objects the subject thinks he can get in exchange from the valuable object;

c) **community** (with whom can I get along with this?): personal relations the subject thinks he can develop using the valuable objects;

d) **communicability** (what can I say with this?): information the subject thinks he can communicate to others with the valuable objects;

e) **sensibility** (what do I feel with this?): feelings the subject experiences with the valuable things;

f) **identity**: objects are valued because they are part of our own identity, or they are means to relate us with the sources of our own identity.

Values are multi-referential

Evaluation processes can be multi-referential: the same object, at the same point in time, can be evaluated in different ways by the same person. This multi-referentiality of values increases when we consider the same object evaluated by different human beings, and/or in different points in time.

This multi-referentiality has several implications:

- a) the six types of values are not necessarily mutually exclusive;
- b) multi-referentiality allows for combinations, as well as for **conflicts** between different types of values;
- c) multi-referentiality allows for **transformations** of one type of value into another.

Types of values

Isomorphism between the values of things and moral values

Since we have defined a general concept of value which can be applied either to things, or to features of human actions, it is natural to expect some kind of relationship between the types of values people give to things and the different approaches to moral values. As we will see in this section, there is an isomorphism between the types of values of things and the main schools of ethical thought.

Use value of things and consequentialist moral values

Things can be valued because they can be used to make other things. Likewise human actions can be valued because they are instrumental to achieve some consequences. In both cases it is the **functional** mode of representation of things and human actions that is at work.

One implication of this type of evaluation is that it makes things and human actions **comparable** among themselves: one thing or one action may be better, worse, or similar to another one for the purpose of achieving a certain aim. Because of this characteristic, use values of things and the consequentialist moral values can be the object of **preference relations**.

A cornerstone of neoclassical economics is to emphasize this type of value and to assume that not only economic agents are able to compare objects of their choice, but also that they have preference relations over those objects which are strict weak orders (irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive).

Exchange value of things and utilitarian moral values

Things have an exchange value when they are considered as permutable with other things. Obviously, exchangeability requires comparability and functionality of things to be exchanged, that is, exchange value is included in the class of use value. However the comparability that is required here is of a special kind. More precisely,

things to be exchanged have to be made **commensurable**, that is, that have to be made comparable on a common measurement scale.

Permutability requires further conditions. One is the explicit presence of, at least, **two** human beings in interaction to exchange the permutable objects between them. In fact, implicitly there are more people involved in this type of valuation, namely all the potential partners of the two parties [COMMONS, 1974].

A third condition is the existence of **potential mutual advantages** for the two parties in the exchange: each one should expect to be better off after the exchange.

A fourth condition is the existence of social norms allowing some **freedom of negotiation** for each party in the exchange.

The third and the fourth conditions make possible an **agreement** between the two parties in the exchange about the terms of trade.

A fifth condition is that each party should have reasonable expectations that the agreement will be fulfilled. These expectations are grounded on the existence of **social norms guaranteeing the reciprocity** of the exchange relation: trust, social reputation, legal and judicial system, etc.

When the objects of valuation are human actions, exchangeability arises when these actions and their consequences on human welfare are made **comparable and commensurable on an interpersonal basis**. This is the approach taken by **utilitarian ethics**: it is good to exchange the worsening of the welfare of some for the improvement of the welfare of the others, if these gainers can compensate the losers.

Informative value of things and discursive moral values

Things can be valued because they are the support of information one wants to communicate to other human beings: a text someone writes, the words someone utters, the uniform a policeman wears, the license plate in a car, the party a rich man gives to show off his wealth, etc. We call this the "informative value" of things.

This type of value has one point in common with exchange value: the expectation of some form of reciprocity. It is not material reciprocity like in the exchange of things when one gets one thing in exchange for another. It is **symbolic reciprocity**: one sends a message with a certain intended meaning and expects, in exchange, the understanding of that meaning by the receivers.

Like in the case of the exchange value of things, symbolic reciprocity cannot be possible without the existence of some social norms which are **common knowledge** to the parties in the communication process and guaranteeing that it works out. In this case they are norms like, for example, the ones that make up the natural languages (syntactic, semantic and pragmatic rules).

From this type of value of things HABERMAS [1983, 1991] has derived an ethics for the valuation of human action: the "**ethics of discussion**". According to him the act of communication to be successful, imposes on the parties the respect of certain norms:

- **understanding** of the utterance;
- **truth** of its contents;
- **correction and appropriate nature** of its components;

- speaker's **sincerity**.

Symbolic exchange value of things and arethologic and deontological moral values

Human beings want **to love** and to be loved, **to like** and to be liked, **to respect** and to be respected, **to protect** and to be protected by other human beings or by some superior beings. These are the kinds of **personal relationships** that contribute to make up a human **community** [MAUSS, 1923-24; GODELIER, 1996; HÉNAFF, 2001] Many times human beings build up these kinds of relationships by **donating** things to those beings from whom they expect to get in exchange that love, sympathy, respect or protection. This may look like the case defining the exchange value of things, but there are important differences:

- here, even though there are two parties in the transaction, only one is active and the other may even not be of this world;

- the transaction of things donated is **not the object of a negotiation** between the two parties involved to reach an agreement on the terms of the transaction;

- what the donator expects to get in return is a certain type of personal relationship with the recipient of his donation which may or may not be fulfilled because the transaction is not necessarily accompanied by mechanisms guaranteeing its reciprocity.

Borrowing an expression coined by BAUDRILLARD [1972, 1976], this will be called the "symbolic exchange value" of things.

One particular kind of donation which fits in this type of value is when human beings voluntarily contribute to the production of a **public good**, expecting others to do the same.

The symbolic exchange value of things relies not so much on the physical characteristics of the things donated, but on the **personal characteristics, or intentions** of the parties involved. A similar situation arises in the valuation of human actions, when value is put not so much on the consequences of the actions, but on the dispositions of character, or the intentions of the actors. The first case corresponds to the "**ethics of virtues**", or **arethological ethics** [ARISTOTE, 1965] and the second case to "**deontological ethics**" [KANT, 1997].

Identitary value of things and transcendental moral values

Things can be valued because they are considered to be part of the individual's or the community's identity. In this case they should not be transformed, exchanged, donated, or enjoyed as objects of pleasure. They should be kept without any kind of transaction, for as long as possible because they are the symbols, or the support of the individual's or the community own life. Often these kinds of things are considered to have their origin or to be the means of communication with the divinity, ultimate source of life [GODELIER, 1996; HÉNAFF, 2002]. In this case they are sacred objects, with a religious meaning. In other cases their nature can be secular, but they may still relate to some founding object of the individual or social life, as is the case, for example, of the human rights established in the constitutions of democratic states.

This kind of value of things, in the field of morality, corresponds to transcendental moral values, namely, theological moral values. In this case, the cognitive source of moral values is the “moral conscienciousness” all normal human beings are supposed to have and its “synderesis”, that is, the intuitive capacity of human conscienciousness for reaching transcendental moral values, as they are revealed to them in this way by God [CUNHA, 2001].

Aesthetic value of things and subjective moral values

Things and actions have value essentially because of our feelings of affection or rejection about them [HUTCHESON, 1971; HUME, 1978; SMITH, 1975]. Without this primary role of feelings there would be no action with respect to things or to other human beings. These feelings can be associated with the specific types of intentions defining the other types of values, but what is stressed here is their role as primary motivation for action.

Table 1: Types of values of things and moral values

	Values of things	Moral values
Functionality	Use value	Consequentialism
Exchangeability	Exchange value	Utilitarianism
Community	Symbolic exchange value	Deontology and ethics of virtues
Communicability	Informative value	Ethics of discussion
Identity	Identitary value	Transcendental moral values
Sensibility	Aesthetic value	Subjectivism

Thingness and value transformation processes of things

Thingness

Things are objects, consisting in particular forms of matter, energy and information existing in a particular location and time [HEIDEGGER, 1987].

Because they are objects, they can exist detached from the existence of a subject (or human being).

Being particular forms of matter, energy and information existing in a particular space and time, they may change in their forms, and location in space and time. We call these changes “**physical transformations of things**”. They are presented in the table below based on the work of LE MOIGNE [1977].

Table 2: Types of physical transformation processes of things

	Form	Location	Durability
Matter	Transformation of matter	Transportation of matter	Conservation of matter
Energy	Transformation of energy	Transportation of energy	Conservation of energy
Information	Transformation of information	Transportation of information	Conservation of information

Types of value transformation processes of things

Since things can become embodied in human lives through the values people give to them, besides physical changes, they can also be subject to changes in their values which we call “value transformation processes of things”.

Table 3: Types of value transformation processes of things

	Vu	Ve	Vse	Vc	Vi	Va
Vu	Technological processes	Mercantilisation processes	Donation processes	Communication processes	Identification processes	Affection/disaffection processes
Ve	Expenditure	Intermediation	Donation	Communication	Identification	Affection/

	processes	processes	processes	processes	processes	disaffection processes
V_{se}	Consumption processes	Mercantilisation processes	Donation processes	Communication processes	Identification processes	Affection/disaffection processes
V_c	Consumption processes	Mercantilisation processes	Donation processes	Communication processes	Identification processes	Affection/disaffection processes
V_i	Consumption processes	Mercantilisation processes	Donation processes	Communication processes	Identification processes	Affection/disaffection processes
V_a	Consumption processes	Mercantilisation processes	Donation processes	Communication processes	Identification processes	Affection/disaffection processes

Given the six types of values presented in the previous section, there are thirty six different types of value transformation processes corresponding to all the possible combinations of those six types of values of things. The names given to these processes are presented in table 3.

Morality, normativity and social equilibration processes

Morality

Human actions are not like things. They are not objects holding a relationship of exteriority with respect to human beings. They are **moments** [HUSSERL, 1963] in the lives of human beings. This means that they are non detachable parts of those lives. This implies that the values human beings give to their actions and, by extension, to the actions of other human beings, are also non detachable parts of themselves. They cannot change those values without changing their identities as individual human beings. This is the reason why when we deal with moral values we cannot talk about value transformation processes in the same way as we deal with changes in the values of things.

Besides this undetachable embodiment of moral values and human lives, moral values also have the characteristic of durability: they don't change as quickly as the values of changes. Another specific feature of moral values is their prescriptiveness: if the subject of these values deviate his behaviour from what is prescribed by his moral values he feels an internal sanction.

Because if these characteristics, as far as moral values are concerned, what one has is consistency or inconsistency of moral values at two levels:

a) **internal consistency or inconsistency** between the individual's actual behaviours and the moral prescribed by his moral values;

b) **external consistency or inconsistency** between the moral values of interacting human beings.

Frequent inconsistencies of the first type and of the second type make social relationships difficult, possibly chaotic.

Social normativity

Social norms (or institutions) like moral values have a certain durability and prescriptiveness. They arise to equilibrate social relationships against the possibilities of frequent inconsistencies of the types presented in the previous sections. In this case the positive or negative incentives for prescribed behaviours are **external** to the individual. They are established by the social group where he lives in. So norms are **common knowledge** for the members of that group and not private knowledge like moral values. For the same reason norms are exterior to the individuals. This does not mean that they are objects like things, since their existence cannot be detached from the existence of human beings. What they are detached is from the existence of particular human beings. Their attachment is to the existence of the group of human beings whose interactions they equilibrate.

Social power

Social norms may be the extension to the whole social group of the type of prescriptiveness corresponding to the moral values of a minority or of the majority of the members of the group. These relationships between moral values and social norms define the pattern of social power in the society, or within a particular human group:

a) **cooperative** power if social norms reflect the moral values of the large majority of the population or are the result of wide democratic discussions;

b) **domination** power if social norms reflect the moral values imposed by a minority to the rest of the population.

Types of social norms

Besides the types of relationships they have with respect to the moral values of the members of the population, social norms can also be differentiated by the types of things and actions they equilibrate. These are not very different from the things and actions which values refer to. So we can differentiate the following types of social norms:

- a) **functional norms;**
- b) **exchange norms;**
- c) **donation norms;**
- d) **communication norms;**
- e) **identity norms;**
- f) **aesthetic norms.**

Possession norms

Concerning the norms referring to things, since they constrain what the members of society can or cannot do to each particular thing, they had another dimension to things, besides their physical forms, their location in space and time and their values. This additional dimension is possession. More precisely, the possession of a particular thing is specified at three different and complementary levels:

a) **identity**: Does it exist or not a non detachable link between that particular thing and a particular individual or social group?

b) **exclusion**: Is it possible to impose exclusion mechanisms for the access of particular individuals to the use of that thing?

c) **rivalry**: Does the use of that thing by an individual reduce the amount available for use by other individuals?

The first of these three levels is regulated by what was called identity norms. It is well known from economic theory, that the other two levels define a typology of goods and services with four groups presented in the table below. These groups should be considered as polar groups, the real cases lying usually somewhere between these four extreme cases.

Table 4: Types of goods and services based on the degree of exclusion and rivalry

	Full exclusion	No exclusion
Full rivalry	Private goods and services	Open access goods and services
No rivalry	Club goods and services	Pure public goods and services

An expanded typology of goods and services can be established by combining the degree of exclusion and rivalry with the possibility of identity features at individual or group level [MENDES, 2003].

We can take this typology as a basis for another differentiation of social norms which crosses essentially throughout technological, exchange and donation norms. The typology is the following:

- a) **distributional norms** regulating the possession and changes in possession of private goods and services;
- b) **imputation norms** regulating the distribution of private and social costs and benefits arising in the production and consumption of open access goods and services;
- c) **coordination norms** regulating the creation and functioning of social groups for the production or consumption of club goods and services (battle of sexes type of problems);
- d) **cooperation norms** regulating the individual contributions for the production of public goods and services (prisoner's dilemma type of problems)

Identity, distributional, imputation, coordination or cooperation norms defining the possession status of goods and services may take particular forms like the following [COMMONS, 1974]:

- a) **liberties or immunities**: what may do to a particular thing without being at risk of social sanctions;

- b) **duties or liabilities:** what goods or services one must provide to some other people;
- c) **rights or powers:** what things an individual or a group can produce or consume;
- d) **disabilities or exposures:** what things an individual or a group cannot produce or consume.

Transaction processes

Because norms are external to individuals, they can change without changing individual's identity. In particular the status of possession of a particular thing defined by the four types of norms defined above can change without changes in the identity of the possessors. Some of these forms of possession on a particular thing can circulate among different human beings or social groups. We call this circulation of forms of possession of things "transaction processes". Some types of transaction processes are the following:

- a) **market processes;**
- b) **contract pocesses;**
- c) **donation processes;**
- d) **command and control processes;**
- e) **persuasion processes.**

Goods and services

We call here “goods” **things** specified by their physical form (combination of matter, energy and information), location in space and time, valuation and statutes of possession. We call “services” the **acts** of human beings or of other beings which change things in terms of their form (**transformation**), their location in space (**transportation**) or in time (**conservation**), their valuation (**value transformation process**) or their status of possession (**transaction process**).

Social equilibration processes

To conclude this section we include in the category of “social equilibration processes” the six types of social processes defined above:

- a) **social power processes** regulating the relationships between moral values and social norms;
- b) creation, functioning and modification of **functional, exchange, donation, communication, identity and aesthetic norms**, including transaction processes of forms of possession of about goods and services.

Human organizations

The concept of human organization we are going to propose combines the concepts, of **human group (or collective)**, **social norms** and **living being**.

According to SCOTT [1987], a collective is defined by the following characteristics:

- a) it is a **bounded network of social relationships**;
- b) there is a **normative order** applying to all the members of the network.

Commitment or submission of a particular human group in a particular society to a particular system of common social norms which apply specifically to the members of that group and not to the rest of the society, including identity norms defining a frontier separating the members from the non members, defines what we call here a human organization. Besides identity norms, in the social norms defining the frontiers of an organization are also very important social power and functional (what is the organization set out to do with the human and physical resources at its disposal?) norms. They define who and how is governed the organisation and for what purposes. Obviously possession and communication norms are also part of the system of internal norms of the organization. All these norms make up the **organization's culture**.

The two characteristics describe so far are not enough to define a human organization. The third important characteristic is that it shares all the features defining the concept of life:

- a) like living beings, organizations have a **birth**;

- b) they also have a **frontier** separating their internal “milieu” from their environment;
- c) they have a “**metabolism**” (social equilibration processes) made of interactions in their internal “milieu” and with their environment;
- d) this metabolism is **teleological**, a major goal being the organization’s survival;
- e) the structure of the internal “milieu” and metabolism of the organization is subject to **evolution** in response to changes in the organization’s goals and environment;
- f) during its life or at the end of its life an organization may give birth to other organizations, of the same kind or of a different kind, through a **reproduction process** subject to “**mutations**” and “**natural selection**”.

References

- ANDRÈS, J. R. F. [1994], *Teologia moral fundamental*, Biblioteca de autores cristianos: Madrid.
- ARISTOTE [1965], *Éthique de Nicomaque*, Traduction, préface et notes par Jean Voilquin, Garnier Flammarion: Paris.
- BAUDRILLARD, J. [1972], *Pour une critique de l'économie politique du signe*, Éditions Gallimard: Paris.
- BAUDRILLARD, J. [1976], *L'échange symbolique et la mort*, Éditions Gallimard: Paris (first edition published in 1972).
- COMMONS, J. R. [1974], *Legal Foundations of Capitalism*, Augustus M. Kelley Publishers: Clifton, N.J. (first edition published in 1924).
- CUNHA, J. [2001], "Breve Teologia da consciência moral", pp. 13-30, in *Ética: Consciência e Verdade. XXII Semana de Estudos Teológicos, 5-9 de Fevereiro de 2001*, Lisboa: Faculdade de Teologia, Universidade Católica Portuguesa: Lisboa.
- DAMÁSIO, A. [1994], *Descartes' Error – Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain*, G. P. Putnam's Sons: New York.
- GODELIER, M. [1996], *L'Énigme du don*, Éditions Fayard: Paris.
- HABERMAS, J. [1983], *Moralbewusstsein und Kommunikatives Handeln*, Suhrkamp Verlag: Frankfurt am Main.
- HABERMAS, J. [1991], *Erläuterungen zur Diskursethik*, Suhrkamp Verlag: Frankfurt am Main.
- HEIDEGGER, M. [1987], *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, Max Niemeyer Verlag: Tübingen.
- HÉNAFF, M. [2002], *Le prix de la vérité. Le don, l'argent, la philosophie*. Éditions di Seuil: Paris.
- HUME, D. [1978], *A Treatise of Human Nature*, 2nd ed., Clarendon Press: Oxford (ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, rev. P. Nidditch, originally published in 1739).
- HUSSERL, E. [1963], *Recherches logiques*. 3 vols. Trad. H. Élie, A. L. Kelkel & R. Schérer., PUF: Paris.

- HUTCHESON, F. [1971], *An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue. In Two Treatises: I. Concerning Beauty or order and Design; II. Concerning Moral Good and Evil*, New York: Garland: New York (1st ed., London, 1725; 4th ed. rev., 1738).
- KANT, I. [1956], *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, Insel Verlag: Wiesbaden (first edition published in 1788).
- KLUCKHOHN, C. *et al.* [1952], "Values and Value-Orientations in the Theory of Action. An Exploration in Definition and Classification" pp. 388-433, in T. Parsons & E. A. Shils (eds.), *Toward a General Theory of Action*, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA. pp. 388-433.
- LE MOIGNE, J.-L. [1977], *La théorie du système general. Théorie de la modélisation*. PUF: Paris.
- MAUSS, M. [1923-24], "Essai sur le don: Forme et raison de l' échange dans les sociétés archaïques", in *L' Année Sociologique*.
- MENDES, A. [2003], *Goods and services*, unpublished manuscript.
- MERLEAU-PONTY [1945], *Phénoménologie de la perception*, Éditions Gallimard: Paris.
- SCHELER, M. [1955], *Le formalisme en éthique et l'éthique matériale des valeurs*, Éditions Gallimard: Paris (first edition published in German in 1916).
- SCOTT, J. [2001], *Power*, Polity Press: Cambridge.
- SIMMEL, G. [1977], *Philosophie des Geldes*, Duncker & Humblot: Berlin.
- SMITH, A. [1975], *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Clarendon Press: Oxford (originally published in 1759).
- TUGENDHAT, E. [1993], *Vorlesungen über Ethik*, Suhrkamp Verlag: Frankfurt am Main.